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Behavioral Dividend Policy 
1. Introduction 
Although dividend policy represents an intensely researched field of modern finance, it is still 
a challenge to financial economists to develop a framework of optimal dividend policy that is 
consistent with empirical observations. Especially two questions have almost remained unac-
knowledged. Due to the tax disadvantage of dividends, the question immediately comes up 
why firms distribute dividends at all.1 In 1979 Black already defined this question as ‘divi-
dend puzzle’ and nowadays Baker, Powell, and Veit (2002) show that it is still unsolved. Sec-
ondly, financial economists puzzle about the question why the nominal dividend per share 
fluctuates less than earnings per share for long time periods.2, 3 Below, both questions are an-
swered in a general setting with regard to a behavioral decision theory, i.e. ‘disappointment 
theory’4. Furthermore, Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001) empirically show past dividends and 
current earnings to be the most important factors influencing the current dividend decision.5 
We place this result on a firm theoretical footing. At last, a framework concretion can reason 
gradual dividend adjustment to sudden unexpected changes in earnings as observed by Lint-
ner (1956).6
 
The disappointment theory belongs to a research field of descriptive decision theories 
emerged at the end of the seventies. Such models are developed as a result of an increasing 
 
1 See Copeland and Weston (1988, p. 480), or Brealey and Myers (2000, pp. 455). 
2 See for an empirical observation Lintner (1956). For more recent evidence, see Baker and Powell (1999), 
Garrett and Priestley (2000) or Allen and Michaely (2001). 
3 Kumar (1988), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) or Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) may also explain the 
smoothing of dividends, but their analysis is very complex in terms of signaling and based on restrictive assump-
tions. See furthermore Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein, and Sarig (1999), who review the existing literature 
about dividend policy and therewith theoretical attempts of solving the dividend puzzle. 
4 See Bell (1985) or Loomes and Sugden (1986), (1987) and, in addition, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, and 
van der Pligt (2000) for an overview. 
5 See Lintner (1956) as well. 
6 Fama and Babiak (1968) approve Lintner (1956). 
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number of observations of anomalies in decision-making,7 and are targeted on explaining ac-
tual behavior.8 In particular, the economic theories, which are based on actual behavior, have 
to apply an accurate identified descriptive theory as the basis for modeling decisions. Thus, 
since the eighties a field of research arose in the range of capital market theory integrating 
certain anomalies of investors in existing literature with the objective to gain new insights, 
especially in terms of pricing. This field of investigation is meanwhile named ‘behavioral 
finance’.9 By the involvement of investor anomalies, findings remain almost descriptive in the 
field of capital market theory; whereas in the area of corporate finance normative recommen-
dations can even be given: in making financial decisions a (fully) rational management should 
be considerate of investor anomalies, and adjust its behavior to it to minimize welfare losses. 
Precisely, the following analysis is based on investors maximizing expected (modified) utility 
with a utility function according to Bell’s (1985) disappointment theory. Pursuant to that the-
ory, an investor will feel disappointment if his chosen option results in an outcome that is 
worse than expected. By anticipating these emotions the limited rational investor’s utility of a 
risky alternative consists of a disappointment function in addition to the straight von Neu-
mann/Morgenstern utility:10 utility does not only depend on the consequence actually arrived, 
but also on the utility deviation from a reference point. On condition that the utility is higher 
than the reference point, an investor feels elation, otherwise disappointment. 
 
Within the context of corporate dividend policy, we assume mental accounting of investors in 
a way that the stock price and the dividend of the evaluated stock are booked in separated 
mental accounts without the consideration of their mutual connection.11 Such preference 
structures can express themselves as follows: if the reference point corresponds to the previ-
 
7 See for a particularly prominent experiment of decisions against the expected utility theory Allais (1953). 
8 See for an overview of such new decision theories Weber and Camerer (1987). 
9 See for a collection of essays about behavioral finance for example Thaler (1993), and for a literature overview 
for instance Barberis and Thaler (2001). 
10 See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). 
11 See Thaler (1985) for mental accounting as well as the further implementations in section 2. 
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ously paid dividend, a dividend drop by one point will cause disappointment. Given an un-
changed profitability, the stock price will increase by one point. With complete and perfect 
capital markets investors can swap that stock price growth for dividends by selling shares. 
Nevertheless, this transformation does not remove the loss in utility provoked by a dividend 
policy against investors’ preferences, because emotions already arose. With limited rational 
investors, different kinds of payments are no longer perfect substitutes.  
 
Even though, Thaler includes behavioral corporate finance on his wish list for further investi-
gations in 1999, the following analysis is not the first trying to answer the questions above by 
involving limited rationality. Against the background of behavioral decision-making, Shefrin 
and Statman already deal with the question why corporations pay dividends at all.12 At first, 
they argue dividends to be a mechanism of control for weak-willed investors, who tend to 
spend dividends for periodic consumption, and increases in stock quotation for retirement.13 
Furthermore, in case of mental accounting, dividend payments can result in a higher utility 
instead of share repurchases. Finally, different effects of regret can have an effect on the 
spending of funds.14 All aspects can lead to a preference for dividends instead of capital ap-
preciation despite of the dividend tax disadvantage. Miller (1986) reviewed these approaches 
to be nice and interesting stories, but special and not formally founded. As the following ap-
proach is deduced from expected (modified) utility maximizing investors, here Miller’s criti-
cism is not suitable. 
 
 
12 See Shefrin and Statman (1984) as well as DeBondt and Thaler (1995, p. 400). 
13 This idea bases on the theory of self-control by Thaler and Shefrin (1981). 
14 Like disappointment theory, regret theory – at the same time developed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sug-
den (1982) – includes emotions in the valuation of alternatives. However, emotions in regret theory appear due 
to a comparison of the arrived result with the result of other alternatives not being chosen. 
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Concerning the smoothing of dividends, Lintner’s model from 1956, which is meanwhile as-
signed to the field ‘behavioral corporate finance’, is up to now referred to.15 According to his 
survey, management decides about changes in dividends each period instead of the absolute 
dividend level. In addition, management aims at dividend smoothing in a way that the nomi-
nal dividend per share fluctuates less than net earnings per share. Though Lintner develops a 
model fitting his empirical observations, it is not based on managers maximizing firm profits 
nor investors maximizing utility. As Miller (1986, p. S467) says: “I assume it [Lintner’s mod-
el] to be a behavioral model, not only from its form, but because no one has yet been able to 
derive it as the solution to a maximization problem, despite 30 years of trying it!“ By maxi-
mizing expected utility of certain preference structures, which will lead to the optimality of 
stable dividends, the following approach is more fundamental on that score. In addition and as 
aforementioned, the dividend adjustment process described by Lintner (1956) can be exempli-
fied with this approach. Thus, we place dividend smoothing as well as dividend adjustment on 
a firm theoretical footing.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2.1. the ‘entrepreneurial’ 
framework is concretized. Section 2.2. is concerned with the description of investor anomalies 
giving a rationale for the assumed utility function. From this, in section 2.3., optimal dividend 
policy in the presence of limited rational investors is deduced. Section 2.4. analyses dividend 
volatility over time. Section 2.5. addresses to Lintner’s dividend adjustment. Section 2.6. con-
tains discussion, and finally, section 3. concludes.  
 
 
15 See Miller (1986), Thaler (1999) or Barberis and Thaler (2001) as well. Beyond, Benartzi, Michaely and 
Thaler (1997) redard Lintner’s model as the best description of the choice of dividend policy available. 
2. The model 
2.1. The ‘entrepreneurial’ framework 
Consider a firm with an infinite time horizon where time is discrete with a set of dates in-
dexed t. At each date t, the firm generates uncertain net earnings tx~ , which are identically and 
independently distributed over time. The realization  of the random variable tqx tx~  is deter-
mined by the state q ∈ {1, ..., J} realized at date t. Thereby,  is the minimum of all possible 
outcomes of 
tJx
tx~  and  is close to zero, but positive (i.e. , ) to guarantee that 
net earnings are not negative. Before state revelation, state q ∈ {1, ..., J} occurs with probabil-
ity p
tJx 0x tJ > 0x tJ →
q. Furthermore, we name the time-independent expected net earnings  and 
we set 
∑ = ⋅= J 1j tjj xp:y
yx~:~ tt −=ε . 
 
At date t income is distributed in terms of a dividend payment  to the  stocks existing 
at the beginning of t whereby the dividend per share  is termed by .
tD 1tn −
1tt n/D − td
16 Management 
can enhance or cut distributable income by external financing on complete and perfect capital 
markets. Thus, distributable income at state q is defined by net earnings  plus cash inflow 
generated by external financing and marked by . Formally, at each state q ∈ {1, ..., J}, the 
corporate budget constraint is given by 
tqx
tqF
tqtqtq DFx =+ . (1) 
Hence, the conditional equation of the dividend per share at date t and at state q directly re-
sults 
1t
tqtq
tqtq n
Fy
)F(d
−
+ε+= . (2) 
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16 The number of stocks nt−1 entitled to dividend payments can no longer be influenced at date t. 
As financial possibilities external equity financing by a variation of total shares outstanding 
 and debt financing by raising funds  at the risk-free rate i are available. Cash inflow 
using bonds  is embodied by the difference between the cash inflow  by raising 
funds at date t and the cash outflow due to the repayment of debt financing done at date t−1:
tqn tqB
)B(F tq
)B(
tq tqB
17
1ttqtq
)B(
tq B)i1(B)B(F −⋅+−= . (3) 
If the sign of  is negative, there will be no raising of funds, but investment at the risk-free 
rate i. In case of external equity financing, the cash inflow  is given by multiplying 
the current stock price  with the alteration of the number of total shares outstanding 
: 
tqB
)n(F tq
)n(
tq
tqS
1ttq nn −−
)nn(S)n(F 1ttqtqtq
)n(
tq −−⋅= . (4) 
In doing so, a positive sign of denotes a capital increase; a negative sign character-
izes a share repurchase. The stock price  (ex dividend) is given by the ratio of the current 
equity value  to the total number of shares outstanding  at the end of date t:  
)nn( 1ttq −−
tqS
tqP tqn
tq
tq
tq n
P
S = . (5) 
The current value , in turn, equates the firm value tqP tqΦ  reduced by the amount of external 
debt financing :tqB
18, 19
tqtqtq BP −Φ= . (6) 
                                                 
17 Liability is assumed to be unlimited. 
18 The amount of external debt financing just equates the current value of debt. 
19 From  and the following equation (6), 0Ptq ≥ tqΦ  serves as an upper limit for . tqB
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The firm value (ex dividend) is given by the sum of all expected future net earnings dis-
counted by the cost of capital :ir:r +′= 20 
.
r
y
)r1/(11
1yy
r1
1yy
r1
1)x~(E
01
ttq
Φ==+−⋅+−=
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⋅+−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⋅=Φ ∑∑
∞
=λ
λ∞
=λ
λ
λ+
 (7) 
The entire cash inflow is then given by 
)B(F)n(FF tq
)B(
tqtq
)n(
tqtq += tq1ttqtq n/)nn(P −−⋅= 1ttq B)i1(B −⋅+−+ . (8) 
From equation (2) and with regard to the validity of Φ⋅+=Φ+ )r1(y
)7(
, at state q the dividend 
per share can be expressed by 
).B,n(SS)i1(
n
r
)B,n(S
n
B)i1()r1(
n
B)i1(B
nn
)nn(P
n
y
)B,n(d
tqtqtq1t
1t
tq
tqtqtq
1t
1ttq
1t
1ttq
1ttq
1ttqtq
1t
tq
tqtqtq
−⋅++Φ⋅′+ε=
−⋅+−Φ⋅++ε=
⋅+−+⋅
−⋅+ε+=
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
 (9) 
Financial decisions at date t only affect dividends by the variation of current stock price , 
which can be managed by debt issues as well as equity issues. In this context, the current 
dividend level is not influenced by the particular kind of financing, so that the actual choice 
between debt and equity is irrelevant in accordance with Modigliani and Miller (1958). To 
simplify the model, we abstract from the concrete financing decision and assume pure debt 
financing (i.e.  for all t).
tS
n:nn 1tt == − 21
 
                                                 
20 The cost of capital r is given in such a way that the stock demand of limited rational investors is positive. Con-
cerning the determination of such a cost of capital as well as an endogenous stock demand by limited rational 
investors we refer to further literature such as Shefrin and Statman (1994), because in the above approach these 
aspects are circumstantial. 
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21 A formal proof is available by the authors. 
Wealth  at state q generated by holding one share for one period can be expressed by the 
sum of the dividend per share plus the stock price at date t minus the opportunity cost of hold-
ing that share. The latter is calculated by the stock price at date t−1 added by accrued interest, 
because the share was bought at that price and funds could be invested risk-freely on the capi-
tal market. Then, that wealth  is given by 
tqv
tqv
=tqv 1ttqtq S)i1(Sd −⋅+−+ . (10) 
This can be rewritten as 
n
r
v tq
)10(),9(tq
ε+Φ⋅′= . (11) 
 
2.2. Investors’ anomalies and the objective function of management 
Rational investors evaluate wealth  from equation (11) by a von Neumann and Morgen-
stern utility function . The value of this utility is not affected by current dividend pol-
icy or otherwise financial policy. Altogether, in this approach the conclusion of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) is still valid with regard to only rational investors: a firm’s dividend policy 
does not affect its value nor the utility of investors. With regard to empirical observations 
about dividend policy, we now attempt to reply to the two questions asked at the beginning of 
the paper. At first, the impact of limited rational investors to dividend policy is analyzed. Sec-
ondly, the optimality of dividend smoothing is verified in the presence of investors with 
anomalies. Thirdly and finally, the process of dividend adjustment is concretized.  
tqv
)v(U tq
 
Henceforth, we assume  limited rational investors, each of them holding one share for 
one period, to exist besides  rational investors.
0nˆ >
nˆn − 22 As rational investors regard dividend 
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22 Rational investors could be taken by institutional investors, and limited rational investors by individual inves-
tors. 
policy as irrelevant, there is no conflict of aims between rational and limited rational investors 
concerning dividend policy. Therefore, management can completely align dividend policy 
with the preferences of limited rational investors. To simplify, we assume all existing limited 
rational investors to have the same preferences. Moreover, the number of shares  held by 
them is assumed to be exogenous, so that management maximizes investors’ welfare by opti-
mizing utility of one representative limited rational investor. 
nˆ
 
In the following, investor anomalies are specified. In accordance with Lintner (1956) as well 
as with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we assume limited rational investors to evaluate divi-
dend growth and stock price appreciation instead of the absolute level of wealth.23 Regarding 
to Thaler (1985), we further assume investors to administer mental accounts for the dividend 
and stock price growth of the evaluated stock, which is expressed by two disjoint, separated 
utility functions  and . Therefore, dividend and stock price growth is separately 
evaluated ignoring mutual connections. Beyond, we abut on disappointment theory by Bell 
(1986). Thus, investors evaluate dividend and stock price growth with a utility function modi-
fied by disappointment instead of a conventional von Neumann and Morgenstern utility func-
tion. This modified utility does not only depend on actual dividend and stock price growth, 
but also on the expectation about the corresponding growth.  
)d,m(
tU
)S,m(
tU
 
The modified, separated utility functions are concretely given by the sum of the von Neumann 
and Morgenstern utility  over dividend, respectively stock price growth, and the felt emo-
tions. The disappointment function  of the dividend account depends on the difference 
of the actual dividend growth  evaluated by the utility function  and a refer-
)(U ⋅
)d,D(U
)1( tqδ+ )(U )d( ⋅
 9
                                                 
23 Lintner (1956) investigated that management does not determine the absolute level of dividends, but rather 
dividend changes. As management decides in investors’ interest, we assume the above mentioned. In addition, 
this assumption corresponds to the observation that investors evaluate changes in wealth rather than final states. 
See hereunto Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
ence point. As in Loomes and Sugden (1986) this reference point is the expectation of the 
assessed value. In this context, it is the dividend growth  expected before realization 
of state, which is given by
)1( )R(tδ+
24
∑
=
δ⋅+=δ+=δ+
J
1j
tjjt
)R(
t p1)
~(E11 . (12) 
Also corresponding to Loomes and Sugden (1986), the disappointment function is strictly 
monotonic increasing [i.e. ], so that the degree of emotion rises with increasing 
distance from the reference point. But, as opposed to Loomes and Sugden (1986), we do not 
assume a function being symmetric to the origin, but a concave function with . 
This assumption accords c. p. to the empirical observation that investors stronger evaluate 
unexpected changes in dividend payments than in stock prices.
0)('U )d,D( >⋅
0)(''U )d,D( <⋅
25, 26  
 
The stock price disappointment function  satisfies the above conditions as well and the 
stock price growth rate  is given by:  
)S,D(U
tqσ
1t
1t
tq
1t
1ttq
)9(
1t
tq
tq S
d
)1(
P
Pir
1
S
S
−
−
−
−
−
⋅δ+−⋅+Φ⋅′+ε=−=σ . (13) 
Consequentially, the expected growth rate  is )~(E tσ
1t
1t
J
1j
tjj
1t
1t
t S
d
p1
P
Pir
)~(E
−
−
=−
− ⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ δ⋅+−⋅+Φ⋅′=σ ∑ . (14) 
In addition, we assume the following relation between stock price and dividend disappoint-
ment function 
)gh(U)h/1()g(U )d,D()S,D( ⋅⋅=  with h > 0. (15) 
                                                 
24 E(·) denotes the expectation operator. 
25 Aharony and Swary (1980) show that markets positively react to dividend enhancements and strongly nega-
tively to dividend decreases. See also Kao and Wu (1994) or Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). 
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26 See Anderson and Sullivan (1993) as well as Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997) who show that, ex post, disappoint-
ment has a larger impact on utility than elation. 
The parameter h characterizes the different degree of ‘absolute disappointment aversion’ felt 
by the investor in the dividend and stock price account. This is analogous to the Arrow/Pratt 
measure of absolute risk aversion.27 According to the latter, the measure of absolute disap-
pointment aversion for dividends can be expressed by , and 
the measure of absolute disappointment aversion for the stock price by 
. Particularly, h equates the ratio of 
, i.e. the ratio of disappointment aversion in case of neither elation nor disap-
pointment. In the special case of constant absolute dividend disappointment aversion, i.e. 
, we can further generalize the parameter h, because the absolute 
stock price disappointment aversion is then also constant [ ]. Thus, in that special 
scenario, h describes the ratio of the measured values of absolute stock price and dividend 
aversion independently of the concrete stock price and dividend value g. 
)g('U/)g(''U)g(R )d,D()d,D()d(A −=
=)g(R )S(A )g('U/)g(''U )S,D()S,D(− )gh(Rh )d(A ⋅⋅=
)0(R/)0(R )d(A
)S(
A
)gaexp()g(U )d()d,D( ⋅−−=
)d()S( a/ah =
 
Corresponding to the modified utility by Loomes and Sugden (1986), the modified separated 
utility functions for dividend and stock price are given by28
)]1()1(U[U)1(U)1(U )R(ttq
)d()d,D(
tq
)d(
tq
)d,m(
t δ+−δ++δ+=δ+    and  (16) 
)]1()1(U[U)1(U)1(U )R(ttq
)S()S,D(
tq
)S(
tq
)S,m(
t σ+−σ++σ+=σ+     (17) 
at date t and at state q. 
 
The total modified utility  is composed by the weighted sum of modified dividend and 
stock price utility. The weights are given by the ratio of the corresponding previous values 
and the sum of the last dividend and the last stock price. This leads to 
)m(
tU
 11
                                                 
27 See for the Arrow/Pratt measure Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964). 
28 However, Loomes and Sugden (1986) do not consider mental accounts, nor do they apply disappointment 
theory to corporate finance. 
)1(U
Sd
S
)1(U
Sd
d
Uˆ tq
)S,m(
t
1t1t
1t
tq
)d,m(
t
1t1t
1t)m(
t σ+⋅++δ+⋅+= −−
−
−−
− . (18) 
For simplification of the later derivations,  is positively and linearly transformed as fol-
lows
)m(
tUˆ
29
.S)i1()1(US)1(Ud
S)i1(Uˆ)Sd(U
1ttq
)S,m(
t1ttq
)d,m(
t1t
1t
)m(
t1t1t
)m(
t
−−−
−−−
⋅+−σ+⋅+δ+⋅=
⋅+−⋅+=
 (19) 
 
2.3. Optimal dividend policy in the case of limited rational investors 
In the following, we assume the von Neumann and Morgenstern utility for the stock price and 
the dividend to be linear.30 This is not synonymous to risk neutral investors, because in the 
present context, risk is measured in terms of disappointment.31 It directly follows from (19) at 
state q and with   as well as  and in consideration of 
(12) to (17) 
g)g(U )i( = S,difor = )(U:)(U )d,D()D( ⋅=⋅
.
S
d
p
P
hU
h
S
pUdv
))]~(E(h[U
h
S
)]~(E[Ud
n
r
U
1t
1t
J
1j
tjjtq
1t
tq)D(1t
J
1j
tjjtq
)D(
1ttq)14(),13(),11(
ttq
)D(1t
ttq
)D(
1t
tq)m(
tq
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ δ⋅−δ−ε⋅⋅+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ δ⋅−δ⋅+=
σ−σ⋅⋅+δ−δ⋅+ε+Φ⋅′=
−
−
=−
−
=
−
−
−
∑
∑  (20) 
Choosing the dividend growth rate tqδ  management’s objective is to maximize the modified 
utility of a representative investor. In doing so, management only influences the disappoint-
ment extend; the first part of equation (20) will remain constant. At each date t, the subse-
quent J simultaneous optimization problems follow 
!maxU
tq
)m(
tq δ
→  for all q ∈ {1, ..., J} (21) 
                                                 
29 Such a transformation has no impact on the ranking of alternatives. 
30 Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) also assume a linear von Neumann and Morgenstern utility func-
tion. 
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31 See for similar considerations Jia and Dyer (1996). 
subject to a positive stock price as well as a positive dividend:32
}.J...,1{qallfor
D
DB)i1()r1(
1
S)i1(
n
r
d0
1t
1t1ttq
tq
1t
tq
tq
∈−⋅+−Φ⋅++ε<δ<−⇔
⋅++Φ⋅′+ε<<
−
−−
−
 (22) 
While in Loomes and Sudgen (1986) only lotteries are evaluated, in this approach investor’s 
modified utility is affected by an actual decision besides a random variable: via dividend pol-
icy, management has the possibility to minimize totally felt disappointment at each state 
, because the state is revealed before the choice of dividend policy, but after in-
vestors built expectations about the state and the concrete dividend policy. Insofar, this model 
is an extension of disappointment theory.  
}J,,1{q …∈
 
At state q the optimal dividend growth rate results from maximization problem (21). Thus33
)Sdh(n
)(h
1t1t
tJtq*
tJ
*
tq
−− +⋅⋅
ε−ε⋅+δ=δ  with34 (23) 
1t
1t1ttJ*
tJ D
DB)i1()r1(
1
−
−− −⋅+−Φ⋅++ε<δ<− . (24) 
The optimal dividend growth rate  at state q equates the growth rate  chosen at the 
worst state, plus a fraction of net earnings enhancement between the current and the worst 
state. Consequentially, in this approach earnings as well as past dividends are crucial determi-
nants of any change in dividends as Lintner (1956) and more recently Baker, Veit, and Powell 
(2001) empirically observed.
*
tqδ *tJδ
35 Calculating )( tJtq σ−σ  from equation (13) and replacing 
                                                 
32 A zero dividend or stock price would lead to zero dividends and stock prices in all subsequent periods, because 
the parameters to choose are growth rates. Therefore positive instead of ‘non-negative’ values are required. 
33 See for proof appendix 1. 
34 If the inequalities (24) hold, the border conditions (22) will also hold at each other state q ∈ {1, ..., J−1}. See 
for proof appendix 2. 
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35 See also Pruitt and Gitman (1991). 
)( *tJ
*
tq δ−δ  with ))Sdh(n/()(h 1t1ttJtq −− +⋅⋅ε−ε⋅  in accordance to (23) leads to the optimal 
stock price growth rate at state q ∈ {1, ..., J−1} 
.
)Sdh(n 1t1t
tJtq*
tJ
*
tq
−− +⋅⋅
ε−ε+σ=σ  (25) 
Again, the optimal growth rate equates the sum of the optimal growth rate at the worst state 
plus a fraction of net earnings enhancement between the current and the worst state. The 
lower h the more does the stock price participate c. p. in changes in net earnings. Furthermore, 
as dividends are spent for current consumption, but stock price enhancements serve for re-
tirement savings,36 a more pronounced dividend than stock price disappointment aversion 
(and thus ) is plausible. Over the long run, risk becomes less important, and therefore, 
chances for stock price enhancement take center stage. 
1h ≤
 
At state q, given an optimal dividend policy as indicated by (23), the utility of a representative 
limited rational investor can be shown as37
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ε⋅⋅+⋅
⋅++=
−−
−−
n)dhS(
hU
h
)dhS(
vU tq
1t1t
)D(1t1t
tq
*)m(
tq . (26) 
Instead, stocks without dividend payments lead to a lower utility amounting to 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ε⋅⋅+=
−
−
nS
hU
h
S
vU tq
1t
)D(1t
tq
)m(
tq

. (27) 
So, the first question can already be answered: dividend payments are optimal; and stocks 
without dividend payments result in welfare losses. Thus, the inclusion of disappointment and 
mental accounts can solve Black’s dividend puzzle, i.e. why firms distribute dividends at all.38 
In the following, we deal with the second question: the puzzle of dividend smoothing. 
                                                 
36 See Shefrin and Statman (1984). 
37 To obtain (26) substitute  according to (23) and insert the result in (20). *tqδ
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38 Introducing taxes in the above framework, dividend payments will still be favored, if welfare losses due to 
limited rationality are higher than losses due to taxes. 
2.4. Dividend volatility over time 
To solve the remaining second puzzle, we need a measure to quantify fluctuations of divi-
dends. Therefore, we use the variance of the dividend growth rate given an optimal dividend 
policy. This variance can be expressed by39
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⋅+⋅ε=δ −− 221t1ttt n)d~h/S~(
1E)~var()~var( . (28) 
Provided that ,1h ≤ 40 the following particularly holds41
( )tt ~var)~var( ϕ<δ , (29) 
with  as the net earnings’ growth rate at state q. Hence, it is shown that 
the variance of the dividend growth rate is less than that of net earnings per existing shares. 
Therefore, the consideration of investor anomalies within the dividend decision leads besides 
the relevance of dividends to the optimality of stable dividends. Especially, this result is inde-
pendent from the concrete choice of . However, the concretion of  is an open question, 
which will be answered in the following section. 
1t1ttqtq x/)xx(: −−−=ϕ
*
tJδ *tJδ
 
2.5. Target payout and dividend adjustment 
Interviewing firms about periodic choice of dividend levels, Lintner (1956) arrives at the con-
clusion that management decides about changes in dividends instead of the absolute dividend 
payout. In doing so, the management aims at realizing a target payout ratio, and gradually 
adjusts the firm’s dividend to it. In 2001 Baker, Veit, and Powell asked managers how they 
determine dividends, too. About half of their respondents replied that they set an explicit tar-
get payout ratio. Pan (2001) also confirms a partial adjustment policy with a long-term divi-
dend payout target in management’s mind, so that Lintner’s results still seem valid for a big-
                                                 
39 See for proof appendix 3. 
40 See for a rationale section 2.3. 
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41 See appendix 3. 
ger part of firms.42 Thus, we can conclude, if net earnings suddenly increase, management 
will gradually adjust dividend payments to the modified profitability, so that it will achieve 
c. p. the target payout ratio in the long run. 
 
In the context of our approach, management has to set a target dividend ratio as well, because 
only the ‘relative’ (referring to states) optimal dividend policy is defined. However, the abso-
lute dividend and stock price level is arbitrary to a certain extent due to  as a degree of 
freedom.
tJδ
43 Following constraint (24), management has to choose  in the interval (−1; 
), which is never empty at a date t, since 
*
tJδ
1D/)B)i1(( 1t1t −⋅+−Φ −− 0B)i1( )12A(1t >⋅+−Φ − . 
Therefore, at each date t management sets 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅+−Φ⋅α−+−⋅α=δ
−
− 1
D
B)i1(
)1()1(
1t
1t
tt
*
tJ  with 10 t <α< ,  (30) 
whereby  can be considered as a firm-specific parameter and may be deduced from empiri-
cal observations.  
tα
 
According to an example of Lintner (1956), a firm paid $2 a share on reasonable stable earn-
ings of $4 a share. After earnings increased to a $6 level, an ultimate adjustment to a $3 divi-
dend rate would be indicated. But, the firm increased the dividend to $2.25 in the first year, to 
$2.50 in the second, and to $2.65 in the third year.44 Up to now, we have generally shown the 
optimality of dividend payments and smoothing as a result of the presence of limited rational 
investors. Henceforth, we exemplify the empirically observed dividend adjustment via our 
framework by a concretion of . tα
                                                 
42 Admittedly, based on annual data of aggregate earnings and dividends from 1871-1993 Pan (2001) finds that 
managers over adjust dividends, but he confirms Lintner when only considering post-war data.  
43 Of course, the constraint (24) has to be considered. 
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44 See Lintner (1956, p. 103). 
Example: 
At each date t, a firm generates certain net earnings amounting to y = $1,000. The risk-free 
interest rate amounts to 1% and the cost of capital r amounts to 5% so that the firm value is 
given by Φ = $20,000 at each date. Furthermore, the parameter h is 1. Beyond, the firm has 
1,000 shares outstanding and chooses 5.0t =α=α  for all t. To be able to calculate the further 
data, we assume a starting point (t = 0) at which the firm has debt outstanding with 
 so that the equity value at t = 0 is given by =−1B =0B 192,19$ =0P $808. The realization of 
the random variable at t = 0 amounts to 00 =ε , which results in net earnings amounting to 
$1,000. Moreover, the dividend payment is given by =0x −+= 192,19$000,1$D0  
. ≈⋅ 192,19$01.1 808$
 
At first, we analyze the effects of a positive shock in net earnings at date 2 amounting to 
 and remaining for the next 12 dates. This income shock leads to net earnings of 
 at t = 2, …12, so that the earnings’ growth rate at t = 2 amounts to 60%, but from 
t = 3 until t = 12 to 0%. The further data can be taken from table 1. 
600$2 =ε
600,1$x t =
 
*** Table 1 here *** 
 
No shock at date 1 results in constant net earnings ( 1000$xx 10 == ) as well as constant 
dividend payments and an unchanged extent of debt financing. After an unexpected increase 
in earnings by 60% to $1,600 as it is at date t = 2, the dividend merely grows by 37% to 
$1,108. The net earnings remain at a level of $1,600 at the following 12 dates. In contrast, the 
dividend payout is further raised the following 8 dates, but the amount of modification de-
clines over time until the dividend equates the target payout of $1,414 at date 12 – on condi-
tion that net earnings remain at the same level as at date t = 2. Recapitulating we can conclude 
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dividends are gradually adjusted, so that the target payout ratio is achieved in the long run.45 
That manner corresponds to the management of dividends described by Lintner (1956). In 
addition, it is evident that the variance of the dividend growth rate in the example is less than 
the variance of the net earnings growth rate even if the dividend rate more frequently changes. 
In this connection, it should be highlighted that in the above context the dividend growth rate 
fluctuates less than the net earnings growth rate over time, and in fact, independently from the 
concrete choice of  as already shown in section 2.4.  tα
 
Now, we briefly address the issue of a permanent negative net earnings shock at date t = 2 
which leads to net earnings of  at t = 2, …12, so that the earnings’ growth rate at t 
= 2 amounts to −60%, but from t = 3 until t = 12 to 0%.
400$x t =
46 The corresponding further data can 
be taken from table 2. 
 
*** Table 2 here *** 
 
After unexpected decreases in earnings as at t = 2, the structure of dividend policy is similar 
to the results after unexpected increases: dividend payments are gradually adjusted until they 
reach the target payout amounting to $202 at date t = 12.  
 
2.6. Discussion 
The presented model points out the possibility of gaining new insights by integrating limited 
rationality in corporate finance. Moreover, empirical observations can theoretically be de-
scribed and explained. Concretely, we deduced why firms pay and smooth dividends. Fur-
 18
                                                 
45 The analysis of Garrett and Priestley (2000) suggests the adjustment to be quicker than earlier assumed by 
Lintner (1956). 
46 We assume the same starting point as in case of the positive net earnings’ shock. 
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thermore, we exemplarily showed how firms adjust their dividend payments to unexpected 
changes in earnings. For these purposes, we basically made three plausible assumptions about 
how limited rational investors evaluate dividends and stock prices. Firstly, investors are as-
sumed to evaluate changes in instead of final wealth. Secondly, we assume that investors 
mentally divide dividends and stock prices. And thirdly, investors are assumed to feel and 
anticipate disappointment and elation in evaluating dividends and stock prices.  
 
The presented approach is just a partial view, because the pricing on capital markets is delib-
erately neglected to keep it simple. Therefore, it remains ambiguous how the cost of capital r 
is determined in a way that both limited and fully rational investors hold shares. An explicit 
analysis of equilibrium has certainly to be developed, and will lead to interesting effects of 
back coupling between dividend policy and firm valuation. However, the partial view already 
results in important and new insights. 
 
Also, the assumption of the solely debt financing for dividend purposes barely does justice to 
the empirically observed endless diversity of financial instruments. Nevertheless, the irrele-
vancy of financial policy tracing back to Modgliani and Miller (1958) still holds. Only divi-
dend policy becomes relevant whereby especially the form of payout (dividends versus capital 
gains) matters. In particular, the results will not change by equity financing as already shown 
by equation (9). 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
Recently, evidence about anomalies in individuals’ decisions and evaluations is mainly inte-
grated in the field of capital market theory for purposes of pricing. Even if the conclusions on 
this field are interesting, these approaches just serve to describe market behavior. However, 
the consideration of limited rationality in connection with corporate finance, which rarely is 
done, can even result in concrete recommendations for management – in this context about 
optimal dividend policy. Insofar, we wish to encourage further research in the area of ‘behav-
ioral corporate finance’. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1: Derivation of the optimal dividend growth rate 
Under consideration of equation (20) we get the following necessary and sufficient conditions  
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In the following, the actual optimal dividend policy is deduced whereby the optimum’s ful-
fillment of the border constraints (22) is proved in appendix 2. Due to  and with ∑−
=
−=
1J
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P−1 is given as47
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It results from (A3) in consideration of (A4) for all q ∈ {1, ..., J−1} 
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whereby  is given, and has to satisfy the following constraint *tJδ
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Appendix 2: Proof that the border conditions are fulfilled 
If the postulated border condition 1t1t1ttqtq D/)DB)i1(y(1 −−− −⋅+−Φ++ε<δ<−  is ful-
filled for q = J, the ‘remaining’ (locally) optimal dividend policy will fulfill the border condi-
tions, too, and thus will be globally optimal as shown in the following 
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47 It is easy to show that P⋅P−1= P−1⋅P = I, whereby I is the identity matrix. 
Appendix 3: Volatility 
It immediately results from (A1) as an optimal variance of dividend growth rate48  
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It follows as the variance of the net earnings’ growth rate tϕ 49
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The volatility of net earning’s growth rate will be higher than that of dividend growth rate, if 
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The latter statement will hold, if 1t1t Fh/P0 −− +≤  for all t. From (22) we have 
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48 With regard to the second transformation see Rohatgi (1976, p. 170). According to him,  =)X~var(
))Y~|X~(var(E))Y~|X~(Evar( +  holds for two random variables X~  and Y~ . Concerning equation (A8), we con-
cretely set )n~)d
~
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49 See the latter footnote and set  and . 1tt X
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Table 1:  
Positive shock in net earnings1
The table shows the reactions over time of the dividend (Dt), the dividend growth rate (δt),  the 
equity value (Pt), and the amount of external debt financing (Bt) to a permanent positive net earn-
ings shock at t = 2 amounting to . 600$2 =ε
 
   t       Dt      δt      Pt       Bt
0 808 0.00 808 19,192
1 808 0.00 808 19,192
2 1,108 0.37 1,108 18,892
3 1,260 0.14 1,260 18,740
4 1,336 0.06 1,336 18,664
5 1,375 0.03 1,375 18,625
6 1,394 0.01 1,394 18,606
7 1,404 0.01 1,404 18,596
8 1,409 0.00 1,409 18,591
9 1,412 0.00 1,412 18,588
10 1,413 0.00 1,413 18,587
11 1,413 0.00 1,413 18,587
12 1,414 0.00 1,414 18,586
13 1,414 0.00 1,414 18,586
14 1,414 0.00 1,414 18,586
 
 
                                                 
1 Numbers are rounded off. 
Table 2:  
Negative shock in net earnings2
The table shows the reactions over time of the dividend (Dt), the dividend growth rate (δt),  the 
equity value (Pt), and the amount of external debt financing (Bt) to a permanent negative net earn-
ings shock at t = 2 amounting to 400$2 −=ε . 
   t      Dt        δt          Pt        Bt
0 808   0.00 808 19,192
1 808   0.00 808 19,192
2 508 −0.37 508 19,492
3 357 −0.30 357 19,643
4 280 −0.21 280 19,720
5 241 −0.14 241 19,759
6 222 −0.08 222 19,778
7 212 −0.04 212 19,788
8 207 −0.02 207 19,793
9 205 −0.01 205 19,795
10 203 −0.01 203 19,797
11 203   0.00 203 19,797
12 202   0.00 202 19,798
13 202   0.00 202 19,798
14 202   0.00 202 19,798
 
 
                                                 
2 Numbers are rounded off. 
